Increasing efficiency of work performance and budget process of the Thai Parliament

The budget process is a crucial mechanism for the government to efficiently plan, allocate, and manage the national budget. While the budget process in the Thai House of Representatives has been improved over the past decade, including the establishment of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to support its operations, the overall budget process and the PBO's operations still face several substantial challenges and obstacles in terms of legal/political aspects, the budget process support system, and management. This research aims to (1) study the mission, status, problems, and obstacles of the PBO, (2) study and analyze the structure, operations, regulations, and Best Practices of Parliamentary Budget Offices in foreign countries (US, Canada, South Korea), (3) study and analyze the factors affecting the PBO's working performance, and (4) provide recommendations for improving, developing, and enhancing the efficiency of the PBO's operations and the budget process of the House of Representatives. This study employed a mixed methodology comprising qualitative and quantitative research methods. The qualitative research methods include documentary research, in-depth interviews with legislative representatives, PBO executives/staff, and academics (law, finance, and budget), and participatory focus groups with 33 relevant stakeholders. Data was analyzed using content analysis. The quantitative research method utilizes the online questionnaires to collect the data from 400 personnel in relevant sectors and analyzed data using descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. The results from qualitative methods reveal that there are two major agencies supporting the House of Representatives in its annual budget consideration, adoption, and monitoring the results of budget administration, including (1) the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) under the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and (2) the Parliamentary Academic Support Office (now renamed the "College of Legislation") under the King Prajadhipok's Institute. Both agencies, despite having different roles, share the same goal; that is, to enhance the capacity of the Thai Parliament to be a legislative body that is knowledgeable, well-informed, and capable of overseeing, scrutinizing, and efficiently and transparently setting the direction for national development. In regards to the finding concerning problems and obstacles of both the PBO and the budget process, it reveals a situation so-called as a "Three-Layer Trap." (1) The first layer is the “Legal Structure” that prevents the legislative branch from being sufficiently independent and risks the commingling of roles with the Executive branch. Moreover, the PBO, which serves as a supporting agency of the legislative branch, is caught in a structural trap of the bureaucratic system. It lacks legal entity to support its status as an independent agency and operates merely as a unit under the bureaucratic system. This leads to the lack of operational independence and no authority to compel the request for information. (2) The second layer is the “Operational Principles and Data Standards,” which still lack transparency and a systematic future-oriented perspective. This can be seen from the practice of not yet allowing the broadcasting of budget review meetings held at the scrutiny committee level. Besides, both the public and the PBO have limited access to data. The data itself is also complex and relatively difficult to comprehend. (3) The third layer is “Operational Capacity” that has not yet provided adequate support for the PBO, one of the main agencies supporting the legislature. This is due to limited and insufficient tools, equipment, and technological systems used for data analysis, storage, and dissemination. They are outdated and cannot perform in-depth analysis of large amounts of data. Additionally, there are insufficient human resources to handle the heavy workload (both primary and secondary tasks), as well as a lack of personnel with necessary knowledge, skills, and competencies in essential professional fields. Moreover, the PBO lacks the legal mechanism supporting its data access, coupled with the lack of a collaborative mechanism that would help enhance the efficiency of the PBO and the budget process. As for the lessons learned from the experiences of the Parliamentary Budget Offices (PBOs) in the three foreign countries—namely the United States (CBO), Canada (OPBO), and South Korea (NABO)—it was found that the PBOs in all three countries are able to operate independently and have their own legal entities. Also, their roles are fairly similar; they include the analysis of the executive budget and socio-economic conditions that may affect the budget, the estimation of costs or expenditures to prevent or mitigate the country’s fiscal burden, and the provision of key information to the legislature. On the contrary, the Thai PBO lacks its own legal entity. Instead, it is merely a bureau under the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and the Parliament. Regarding the quantitative research results, the survey of 357 respondents found that opinions on the three main factors affecting the work performance of PBO were overall at a "High" level. The details are as follows: 1) Political and Legal System Factors: The overall opinion was high. The most highly rated issue was the Executive's support or cooperation in providing information impacting PBO performance. 2) Budget System Management and Support Factors: The overall opinion was high. The highest-rated issues were the principle of Utility and Transparency. However, the lowest-rated factor in this group was the principle of Democracy. 3) Management Factors: The overall opinion was high. The highest-rated issue was Organizational Structure Management. Furthermore, success in PBO performance (Dependent Variable Y) was largely rated high. The most successful dimension was Transparency and Auditability, while the least successful was Disseminating budget information to the public. Additionally, the multiple regression analysis identified the factors with significant influence on PBO success as: Leadership (X18), Efficiency Principle (X11), Organizational Structure Management (X13), Constitutional Provisions, Laws, and Political Conventions (X1), and the Balance of Political Power in the House of Representatives (X3). Based on the findings of both qualitative and quantitative research methods, the researchers have proposed policy recommendations to enhance the efficiency of the PBO's operations and the parliamentary budget process, which can be divided into two parts: - Policy recommendations improving the efficiency of the budget process - Short-term recommendations: Utilization of "observations" and/or "suggestions" from budget scrutiny committee as a mechanism for monitoring, inspection, and evaluation of budget administration; live broadcast of committee meetings; and creation a pre-budget statement. - Long-term recommendations: Amendment of the Constitution, specifically Section 77 to add a clear mechanisms for promotion of public participation, and Section 144 to revise the disproportionately severe penalties for legislative representatives in the budget process. Furthermore, the Thai Parliament should considers integrating the Gender-Responsive Budgeting (GRB) into its practices. - Policy recommendations enhancing the PBO Operational Efficiency - Short-term recommendations: Leadership and staff competency development; promotion of an innovation culture; review of staffing plans; establishment of cooperative networks/MOUs with related agencies to improve data access and decision-making; improvement of understanding of political dynamics to maintain neutrality; and investment in short-term technology (computers, statistical analysis software). - Long-term recommendations: Strengthening the legal framework and promoting the PBO's independence; organizational structure management that fosters participation and neutrality; and investment in long-term technology (AI, Big data).