The Legislature’s Budgetary Autonomy

The autonomy of the legislature constitutes a core element of constitutional democracy, particularly in its function of scrutinizing and constraining the exercise of executive power. Such autonomy, however, cannot be meaningfully realized if the legislature lacks independence in the most fundamental condition of institutional functioning - its budgetary autonomy. Public budgets are not merely financial instruments; they are mechanisms of power that determine the scope, capacity, and effectiveness of state institutions in fulfilling their constitutional mandates.

This study examines the degree of budgetary autonomy enjoyed by Thailand’s legislature under the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand and the relevant fiscal legislation. It seeks to analyze the structural deficiencies embedded in the budgetary process, arising from the misalignment between constitutional principles and secondary legislation as well as administrative practice. The study further proposes policy-oriented legal and institutional reforms aimed at transforming  budgetary autonomy from a formal constitutional principle into an operational institutional reality.

Employing a mixed-method research design, the study combines documentary analysis, comparative legal research, and qualitative fieldwork. The documentary component reviews theoretical and conceptual frameworks concerning the separation of powers, legislative autonomy, and budgetary independence, alongside an analysis of Thailand’s constitutional and statutory framework, including the 2017 Constitution, the State Fiscal and Financial Discipline Act B.E. 2561 (2018), and the Budgeting Procedures Act B.E. 2561 (2018). The qualitative component consists of in-depth interviews with representatives of parliamentary bodies, budgetary authorities, and experts in constitutional and fiscal law, aiming to identify structural constraints affecting the legislature’s budgetary autonomy in practice.

The findings reveal that, notwithstanding constitutional and statutory recognition of the principle that Parliament should receive adequate funding to perform its functions independently, the Thai legislature remains subject to an executive-dominated budgetary structure. Key limitations include the Constitution’s protection of legislative autonomy only at the amendment stage of budget approval, the absence of institutional criteria for assessing the adequacy of parliamentary funding, and statutory provisions that permit executive agencies to determine budgetary ceilings and revise parliamentary budget proposals. As a result, budgetary autonomy exists largely at the level of constitutional rhetoric rather than as an effective institutional safeguard.

Comparative analysis of selected jurisdictions, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and South Korea, demonstrates that genuine legislative budgetary autonomy depends not on the formal type of political system but on the presence of specifically designed legal and institutional mechanisms. Drawing on these comparative insights, the study proposes reforms that include restructuring the parliamentary budget formulation process to reduce executive intervention, recognizing Parliament’s budget as a distinct and protected budgetary category, and enacting a dedicated statute governing parliamentary budget administration.

In conclusion, ensuring the legislature’s budgetary autonomy is not merely a technical adjustment within public financial management but a constitutional imperative. It represents a structural affirmation of the separation of powers and a necessary condition for strengthening Parliament’s capacity to function as an effective and independent check on executive authority within Thailand’s constitutional democracy.